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 It is the thesis of this paper that the main causes for the failure of 
the European Constitution result from the bad preparation and man-
agement of a complex process of constitution-making for a union of 
states of continental proportions. The crucial reasons for the failure of 
the European Constitution are elaborated as certain preliminary 
propositions. The first proposition is that in the normative sense, 
there is no reason and need for the people to be directly engaged in 
the creation of a confederal union or in the amending of its funda-
mental documents. The next and related proposition is that there are 
powerful political reasons to avoid popular ratification of constitu-
tional documents, especially in federal unions. The argument is that a 
referendum is more suitable for pulling down than to build up Con-
stitutions is similar to the former – that the people should have noth-
ing with confederations. However, the former argument starts from 
the normative proposition that the people should not ratify confederal 
treaties, and the latter means to point out that there could be signifi-
cant problems with constitutional acceptance when that constitution 
has to be ratified by some sort of direct involvement of citizens (by 
people’s conventions or referendum). The third argument is that the 
European constitution-makers’ ambivalent approach to the method of 
constitutional ratification and the complete absence of a ratification 
strategy, resulting in the compromise procedure of ratification “in ac-
cordance with their respective constitutional requirements”, was ex-
tremely detrimental from the standpoint of ratification. The final error 
is that they have not made use of comparative experiences of consti-
tution-making of other federal unions. 
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Introduction 
 In Brussels, February 2002, the Convention on the Future of Europe 
started and it declared very soon that its aim was to make a comprehensive 
European constitution, or at least a constitutional treaty.1 Following the fin-
ishing of the preliminary draft of the Constitution in June 2003, and the 
hardly achieved agreement of the European Council on the final constitu-
tional proposal to be sent to the Member States for ratification in October 
2004, this most significant, comprehensive and longest constitution-making 
process of the European Union (Jopp and Matl, 2005) seems to be stuck on 
the final obstacle – the acceptance of the people in the referendums in 
France and the Netherlands.  
 More than five years after the beginning of the Convention of the Future 
of Europe, the prevailing opinion is that the EU constitution is dead or at 
least in a deep coma. For comparison, the highly successful American con-
stitution-making process, as remarked by the distinguished historian Jack 
Rakove, lasted less than two years, taking into account the period from the 
unsuccessful convention in Annapolis in September 1786 until the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution by the 11th state, New York, in July 1788 (Rakove, 
2003).2 As Article 447 of the Draft Treaty prescribes, the Constitution has to 
be ratified by all the Member States, in accordance with their constitutional 
requirements. It is clear that the Constitution cannot come into force in case 
of non-ratification even by a single country. The British The Economist was 
the first to predict the failure of the European constitution, so I accept its 
opinion on the possibility of the ratification of the existing constitutional 
text: “[S]ticking with the whole constitution and nothing but the constitution 
will make it even harder to rescue any of its useful bits. It would surely be 
easier to try to carve up the corpse for the organs, rather than to try to jolt the 
whole thing lumberingly back to life” (“Back from the dead”, January 7th, 
2006).  
 Many analysts have been trying to explain the failure of the European 
Constitution. Some found it in the domestic politics of France or the Neth-
erlands, or in the discontent of voters in these countries with the processes of 
the European integration (Eastern enlargement and the possible Turkish ac-
cession to the EU, the Euro, general uneasiness with the EU, Anglo-Saxon 
 
1 The official name of the Convention’s document is ‘The Treaty on establishing the 
Constitution for Europe’, but most often the document is called “constitution” or “constitutional 
treaty”.  
2 However, we could also say that the American constitution-making process ended in 
December 1791, with the ratification of the first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights). 
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economic liberalism, etc.). I would rather say that the main causes of the 
failure of the European Constitution are to be found in the bad preparation 
and management of a complex process of constitutional ratification for a 
union of states of continental proportions. My first proposition is that in the 
normative sense there is no reason and need for the people to be directly en-
gaged in creating a confederal union or in the amending of its fundamental 
documents. As the European constitution makers did not conceive their Con-
stitution (or constitutional treaty) to be a transformative document changing 
the European Union from a confederal union of states to a federal state (or 
federation), as was the case in the United States in 1787, there was no theo-
retical or even practical reason to argue for a popular referendum for ratifi-
cation of that document.  
 My next and related proposition is that there are powerful political rea-
sons to avoid popular ratification of constitutional documents, especially in 
federal unions. The argument is that the voting of people is more suitable for 
pulling down than to build up Constitutions is similar to the former – that the 
people should have nothing with confederations. However, the former argu-
ment starts from the normative proposition that the people should not ratify 
confederal treaties, and the latter means to point out that there could be sig-
nificant problems with constitutional acceptance when that constitution has 
to be ratified by some sort of direct involvement of citizens (by people’s 
conventions or referendum), especially at a supranational or federal level.  
 My third argument is that the European constitution-makers’ ambivalent 
approach to the method of constitutional ratification and the complete ab-
sence of a ratification strategy, resulting in the compromise procedure of 
ratification “in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”, 
was extremely detrimental from the standpoint of ratification. They did not 
propose one ratification procedure binding for all member states. In that case 
they could have opted for a standard parliamentary ratification (avoiding all 
references to the ‘constitutional’ content of the document they have elabo-
rated), or they could have insisted on popular acceptance, but in that case 
choosing the most favorable rules for the successful ratification. They did 
neither. A majority of them insisted on the new constitutional terminology 
and quality of the document, but at the same time they did not have the cour-
age or cleverness to devise a ratification procedure suitable for this kind of 
document. Instead, they let each Member State choose its own way to ratifi-
cation, which decision resulted in the disastrous choice by the French and 
Dutch politicians. Leaving to each Member state to pursue the ratification 
according to its constitutional requirements was actually the worst possible 
compromise.  
 Last but not least, the European constitution-makers did not make use of 
comparative experiences of constitution-making in other federal systems, 
notably American and Swiss, regarding their solutions to the problem of rati-
fication of the constitution in a union of many member states. Had they done 
that, they would probably have arrived at some different solution, especially 
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as to the constitutional ratification procedure and the strategy of ratification 
of the Constitution.  
 
The assent of the people is not necessary to the formation of 
a confederation  
 The first argument I would like to elaborate is that in the normative sense 
there is no reason and need for the people to be directly engaged in the crea-
tion of a confederal union or in the amending of its fundamental documents.3 
This thesis was actually stated for the first time by the American antifeder-
alists during the great ratification debate on the proposed Philadelphia Con-
stitution. Criticizing the proposed ratification of the Constitution by the peo-
ple’s conventions the leader of the antifederalist opposition in Virginia’s 
ratification convention, Patrick Henry explained why popular ratification is 
not needed: “The assent of the people in their collective capacity is not nec-
essary to the formation of a federal Government. The people have no right to 
enter into leagues, alliances, or confederations: They are not the proper 
agents for this purpose: States and sovereign powers are the only proper 
agents for this kind of Government. Show me an instance where the people 
have exercised this business: Has it not always gone through the Legisla-
tures? I refer you to the treaties with France, Holland, and other nations: 
How were they made? Were they not made by the States? Are the people 
therefore in the aggregate capacity, the proper persons to form a Confeder-
acy?” (Dry, 1985: 304) 
 In the terminology of the 18th century American constitutional polemic 
the terms ‘federal government’ and ‘confederation’ had the same meaning 
and Henry was using them as synonyms. The Articles of Confederation were 
ratified by the state legislatures, and therefore Henry was right. 
 However, the constitution-makers accepted Madison’s view that the Arti-
cles were defective exactly because the federal treaty, inasmuch as it was ac-
cepted by the state legislatures, did not have legally higher status than any 
other state law. The Articles of Confederation, as a mere treaty “between 
governments of independent states”, were continuously violated, and that 
opened up the possibility of its termination. Madison was convinced that “in 
the case of a union of people under one Constitution” this possibility was out 
of question and because of this he thought that it was necessary to base the 
new Constitution on the acceptance by the people. Madison said in the Con-
vention that the crucial difference between a league and a treaty, in relation 
to a constitution, was in the fact that the former was based only on the legis-
latures, and the latter on the people: a league is a treaty between state gov-
 
3 For a contrary argument advocating a mandatory referendum for any new contract and 
quasi-constitutional steps in the EU requiring the consent of majorities in all Member States for 
its ratification see Abromeit, 1998. 
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ernments, and a constitution is ‘a union of people’. Beside this, as the new 
Constitution “would make essential inroads on the State Constitutions”, 
Madison considered that “it is indispensable that the new Constitution 
should be ratified in the most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme 
authority of the people themselves”, because the people were “the fountain 
of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They 
could alter constitutions as they pleased” (Farrand, 1966, 1; 122-3, 2;92-3, 
476). The new system, based on the approval of the people would therefore 
eliminate all possible controversies and doubts about the legitimacy of the 
proposed Constitution. However, it should also be stressed that there were 
significant tactical reasons to avoid ratification by the state legislatures, be-
cause the constitution-makers considered them to be ‘losers of power’ in the 
new system. 
 In the nationalist interpretation of the creation of the American Constitu-
tion its acceptance by the people’s conventions will always be seen as a cru-
cial feature which separates the new federal system (later called federation), 
resting on the acceptance of a single American people, from the earlier Con-
federation, resting on the treaty between state legislatures.4 The states’ rights 
interpretation, on the other hand, would emphasize the constitutional ratifi-
cation by the consent of state peoples, as sovereign political communities.  
 However, the question is: Could these experiences of the American 
constitution-making be applicable in the making of the European Constitu-
tion? First, I would like to stress that I see the European Union, taking into 
consideration all of its unique features, as a union of states, with predomi-
nant characteristics of the kind of federal system which is usually called a 
confederation. This definition is generally accepted by the majority of schol-
ars.5 
 
4 As one of the supporters of this thesis Herbert Storing claims: “The provision for ratifying 
the Constitution rested, in the main, on the…assumption that the American states are not several 
political wholes, associated together according to their several wills and for the sake of their 
several interests, but are, and always were from the moment of their separation from the King of 
England, parts of one whole. Thus constitutional change is the business of the people, not of the 
state legislatures, though the people act in (or through) their states. As one nation divided into 
several states, moreover, constitutional change is to be decided, not by unanimous consent of 
separate and equal entities, but by the major part of a single whole– an extraordinary majority 
because of the importance of the question” (Storing, 1981: 13). 
5 A representative sample of scholars treating the EU as some sort of a confederation: 
Elazar sees the EU as “the model post-modern confederation” (Elazar, 1998). Alexander War-
laigh calls it a “structural confederation” (Warlaigh, 1998). John Kincaid claims that it works as 
a “confederal federalism, namely, as a confederal order of government that operates in a signifi-
cantly federal mode within its spheres of competence” (Kincaid, 1999). For Andrew Moravcsik 
the EU seems to be “more confederal than federal” (Moravcsik, 2001). Joseph Weiler thinks 
that it is “a combination of ‘confederal institutional order and ‘federal’ legal order” (Weiler, 
2001) The most profound theoretician of confederalism today Murray Forsyth thinks that the 
EU is best understood as an “economic confederation” (Forsyth, 1981). Michael Burgess con-
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 The American constitution-makers were troubled by the fact that the 
Articles of Confederation legally did not have higher status than ordinary 
state laws and by continuing breaches of the confederal treaty by several 
states. The European constitution-makers did not have to face these kinds of 
problems. What is always fascinating for analysts of European integration is 
an extraordinary constitutional discipline characterizing the Member States 
of the EU, in comparison with other examples of federal unions.6 
 The motive for the popular adoption of the Constitution remains the wish 
to make the European integration project more legitimate i.e., to help the EU 
outgrow the frames of a confederation or a mere treaty between states; ex-
actly as Madison proposed for the United States in Philadelphia.7 
 “Europe’s constitutional architecture has never been validated by a proc-
ess of constitutional adoption by a European constitutional demos” (Weiler, 
2003: 9) – this remark from Joseph Weiler seems to me to be the basic rea-
son and motive for initiating the European constitution-making process. 
Such a ‘constitutional demos’, in his opinion, exists in contemporary federa-
tions (American, Australian, German, and Canadian); although at the time of 
the creation of these federal unions and nations, it perhaps did not exist, be-
cause the legal presupposition of the existence of a constitutional demos 
does not have to be confirmed in the political and social reality. The example 
of the United States in the pre-Civil War decades, or the contemporary ex-
amples of Canada or Spain, as pointed out by Weiler, show that the legal 
presupposition of a unitary nation is contradicted by the social reality of 
multiple ethnic groups or nations, which do not share a feeling of common-
ness, and which do not constitute a political community essential to a con-
stitutional compact. In Weiler’s thinking the creation of a constitution has to 
be connected with the existence of a constitutional demos i.e., with the pres-
 
cluded that “the most accurate description of the contemporary EU remains that of a confedera-
tion but it is certainly more than a mere ‘economic confederation’’” (Burgess, 2000: 265). 
The almost impossible-to-translate notion of ‘staatenverbund’, used by the German Con-
stitutional Court in its famous opinion on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht, 
shows that the EU is essentially a ‘union of states’ (staatenbund), and not a ‘federal state’ 
(bundesstaat). On various understandings of the essence of the term staatenverbund see Wie-
gandt, 1994-1995. 
6 Especially interesting is the study of Leslie Friedman Goldstein about the processes of 
federalization, i.e. of the reasons why the sovereign Member States of the EU have, as a rule, 
more easily accepted the verdicts of the European Court of Justice than the American states ac-
cepted the decisions of the Supreme Court in the first 70 years after the ratification of the Con-
stitution (Friedman Goldstein, 2001). 
7 The former judge of the German Constitutional Court Dieter Grimm has brought the the-
sis that the European Constitution was not important because of its legal function, but because 
of its “anticipated collective and emotive benefits and thus its integrative value”, as other possi-
ble integrative factors (like nationality, language, religion, history, culture or common enemy) 
do not exist (Grimm, 2005) 
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ence of a single pouvoir constituent, consisting of the citizens of the federa-
tion in whose sovereignty a specific constitutional arrangement is rooted. 
 If the European Constitution is formally ratified by a ‘European constitu-
ent power’, which assumes any kind of all-European constitutional plebi-
scite, this act would be, in Weiler’s view, of huge legal and political impor-
tance and transformative to present European constitutionalism. In case of 
such an all-European constitutional referendum, according to Weiler, the EU 
would become “a federal state in all but name” (Weiler, 2003: 7-9). How-
ever, the approval of the Constitution by the peoples of Europe “in their 
status as national communities, will affirm the constitutional status quo, in-
dependently of the content of the document” (Weiler, 2002, 566), as he ex-
plains in another place, “if a ‘constitution’ be anything other than a Euro-
pean constituent power, it will be a treaty masquerading as a constitution” 
(Weiler, 2003: 7). This means that even if all Member States held constitu-
tional referendums, but the decision to hold one was arrived at individually 
by the states, the Constitution would be still an intergovernmental treaty.8 
 The fact is that in today’s Europe such a ‘constitutional demos’ necessary 
for the creation of a federal state does not exist – European integration at all 
times assumes a constitution without the traditional political community 
which would be defined and proposed by that constitution (for a contrary 
opinion see Backer, 2002; Mancini, 1998; Habermas, 2001). As the French 
philosopher, Etienne Balibar observes, the European Constitution “presumes 
to be resolved what is in fact in question: the nature and existence of the 
constituent power on the European level” (Euro-elites desperately seeking 
demos, Spiked-politics 21 February 2005).  
 During the Confederation period in the United States a significant part of 
the political elite (the Federalists) assumed that a single American nation 
was created in the War of Independence, and therefore they held the basic 
presumption that the American people should be entrusted with the role of a 
pouvoir constituent. However, another faction of the same elite (the Antifed-
eralists) thought that it was more correct to assume the existence of 13 dif-
ferent nations. In today’s Europe, there is no such dilemma – ‘Federalists,’ 
who would base the European Constitution on a European constitutive 
power, do not form a politically relevant part of the elite in the several 
Member States. Just the opposite, the dominant attitude, as elaborated in as 
early as 1993 by the German Constitutional Court in its Maastricht opinion, 
is that a union of democratic states and peoples, like the EU finds its democ-
ratic legitimacy in acts of the national parliaments, which are representatives 
of each single people (BVerfGE 89, 155 (184)).  
 The debate about legitimating the European process of integration has 
been for years characterized by the assumption that it is possible to transfer 
 
8 This opinion was shared by all American states’ rights theoreticians in their interpretation 
of the ratification process of the American Constitution. 
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on the European level, and accommodate to it the constitutional principles 
associated with the state level. The non-existence of affinity or mutual un-
derstanding between the EU institutions and the citizens is always empha-
sized, but as Antje Wiener asks “why should it matter at all, if the Euro-pol-
ity is not expected to turn into anything akin to a nation state?” (Wiener, 
2003:188).  
 If, then, there are today no indications of a possible European constitu-
tive power, the whole project of formalization and rationalization of the 
contemporary European confederation in one document should have been 
divested of any constitutional rhetoric and the need to legitimize that docu-
ment directly by the people.  
 The most important question, in my opinion, is whether some kind of 
international democracy is possible and whether there is a possibility to de-
mocratically legitimize the EU in the same way as national states. Robert 
Dahl recently posed this question, and he did not find real the possibility that 
international systems develop basic political institutions of modern repre-
sentative democracy (Dahl, 2005). Even in the EU, which has gone further 
than any other international organization in the development of democratic 
institutions, and is actually the only supranational polity debating about 
‘democratic deficit’, there are exceptional obstacles to developing a democ-
ratic framework.9  
 Even if the European constitution-makers could agree on some basic de-
mocratic principles common to the constitutions of the several Member 
States, as e.g. people as a fountain of all power, majority government, re-
sponsibility of all public institutions, separation of powers, independent ju-
diciary, it is a question how these general principles would be put to work in 
a supranational system, in the sense of constitutional choices between the 
presidential or parliamentary (or semi-presidential) system, different models 
of separation of powers, models of judicial review, electoral systems, etc. 
 Furthermore, there is an exceptional diversity of citizens inside this inter-
national system – in their historical experiences, identities, cultures, values, 
loyalties, and languages. This questions the creation of a political culture 
that would induce citizens to support their political institutions during the 
conflicts and crises. In the end, to quote Dahl, “the nature of many interna-
tional decisions makes it extremely difficult and even impossible for most 
citizens to provide their informed consent to the decision” (Dahl, 2005: 200). 
Citing the example of the USA, Dahl says that even federalism cannot sur-
 
9 On this Eric Stein says: “Today in Europe, modern democracy appears in a great variety 
of systems in which the voice of an individual citizen is heard in varying ways and degrees. It 
ranges from the ‘omnipotent Parliament in Westminster to the republican-presidential system in 
France, the consensual pattern in Switzerland, the strong regionalism in Spain, and the federal 
variants in Germany, Austria and Belgium …It is not surprising that the builders of the new 
Community would look to their own systems for a specification of the general principle (of de-
mocracy).” (Stein, 200: 524). 
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vive the deep economic, social, cultural, and geographic cleavages that ex-
isted between North and South in the first half of the 19th century. Although 
it is difficult for me to accept Dahl’s claim that the inhabitants of the US in a 
great majority considered themselves to be Americans already by 1790, and 
had the feeling of common nationality very soon after the creation of the 
Union (Dahl, 2005: 202). When it is impossible to imagine democratic in-
stitutions that exist on the level of nation-states to exist on the level of inter-
national organizations, it is also impossible to think of the EU as a new fed-
eration in creation, let alone as a federation of nation-states. 
 In that sense, the referendums on European treaties or on the proposed 
Constitutional treaty are completely unnecessary and inappropriate in a con-
federal system such as the EU and would remain even after the possible ac-
ceptance of the Constitution. 
 International treaties concluded every few years between the Member 
States (from the Single European Act of 1986 to the Treaty of Nice of 2001 
there were four such treaties) are the result of complicated intergovernmental 
agreements, often after awkward negotiations. Compromises usually the re-
sults of such negotiations are difficult to explain to the wider public in sev-
eral states. Nevertheless, the heads of states and governments who have 
reached the deal inside the European Council could guarantee that this 
agreement will be ratified by the parliament in each state because govern-
ments can usually count on the majority support in the legislature. Moreover, 
European treaties have been often ratified in parliaments by the consensus of 
the most important majority and opposition parties. On the other hand, plebi-
scitary voting of the citizens has proven to be very perilous, and one should 
not expect any new treaty to be simply and quickly accepted if its ratification 
depends on the direct voting of the citizens. Besides, it is difficult to decide 
in a referendum simply with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ when you are often confronted 
with complex compromises, resulting from intergovernmental bargaining. 
 
The voting of the people better fitted to pull down than to 
build up constitutions  
 Oliver Ellsworth, one of the members of the Connecticut delegation in 
the Philadelphia Convention, argued in one of debates on the ratification ar-
ticle of the Constitution that he did not like “these conventions”, because 
“they were better fitted to pull down than to build up Constitutions”. His 
colleague from Massachusetts, Elbridge Gerry similarly anticipated that 
“great confusion … would result from a recurrence to the people. They 
would never agree on anything” (Farrand, 1966, 1; 335, 2;90).  
 Both of them, as their like-minded colleagues in Philadelphia, had the ex-
perience of the state of Massachusetts in sight, where the people had barely 
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approved the state Constitution for the third try.10 Incidentally, Massachu-
setts was the first American state to do so. The extent of the American con-
stitution-makers’ skepticism about the people’s involvement in deciding on 
the Constitution is showed by the fact that in the final vote on the issue there 
were as much as four (out of ten) delegations at the time in Philadelphia 
against the ratification of the Constitution by the conventions (Farrand, 
1966, 2;476). 
 There is similarity between the argument that the voting of people is dan-
gerous from the standpoint of the constitutional ratification and the earlier 
one, that the people should have nothing with confederations. The only dif-
ference is that the former argument is normative (people should not ratify 
confederal treaties), and the latter points to the political problems with the 
constitutional acceptance, especially in federal unions, when that constitu-
tion has to be ratified by some sort of direct involvement of citizens (peo-
ple’s conventions or referendum). 
 I would like to point out that the American federal Constitution was not 
accepted by referendum in several states, as it is the usual method today 
when a constitution is submitted to the people for acceptance in numerous 
countries, but by the people’s conventions. In these conventions the dele-
gates of particular districts often did not represent the views of their con-
stituencies authentically, nor did electoral districts have the same number of 
electors (it is a well-known fact that the Federalist districts, mostly at the 
coast, and the commercial areas of the USA, were over-represented in some 
state conventions). Certain historical researches of the voters divisions pro et 
contra the Constitution indicate that the opponents of the Constitution might 
have had a minimal majority across America, that in four states they had a 
significant majority, and in another two a minimal majority (Main, 1974: 
249).11 This actually means that the American Constitution, which needed 
the acceptance of at least 9 of 13 states for ratification, might never have 
been ratified had it relied on the direct vote of the people (as was the case 
with the Constitution of Massachusetts), and not by the indirect voting in the 
people’s conventions. 
 With all the glorification of the principle of popular sovereignty in Amer-
ica, it is often forgotten that after the problematic and hazardous experience 
with the adoption of the Constitution of Massachusetts and the federal Con-
 
10 That Constitution was drafted by John Adams, one of the greatest American statesmen. 
11 Charles Beard was the first to claim that it is “questionable whether a majority of voters 
participating in the elections for the state conventions in New York, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Virginia, and South Carolina, actually approved the ratification of the Constitution” 
(Beard, 1986: 1913, 325). Although they dispute these data about the Antifederalist majority in 
some states Riker and Fink state that the Antifederalists had a majority of delegates in five or 
six state conventions. This would have been enough to preclude the acceptance of the Constitu-
tion, but for the fact that a certain number of delegates did not changed sides during the con-
vention proceedings (Fink and Riker, 1987: 227).  
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stitution the praxis of constitutional conventions in the USA and in several 
states was very rare in the next half a century in American constitutional 
history. Until 1812, there was no state other than New England willing to 
submit its draft constitution to popular approval. By the end of the 1830’s 34 
state constitutions were adopted, but only six by popular approval (Rodgers, 
1987: 86-7, 236). Moreover, the fact that the amendments to the federal 
Constitution were, as a rule, adopted by state legislatures (all except one)12 
did not conform to the principle of popular sovereignty. We could ask our-
selves: if state legislatures decided on the amendments to the US Constitu-
tion, why would it be undemocratic to let the parliaments of the Member 
States decide on EU treaties, or even the EU Constitution? 
 Numerous politicians in the EU are skeptical about European referen-
dums because, as they say, European issues are too complex. “When we ask 
voters a European question, the answer is either no, or yes by only the nar-
rowest of margins. That should be telling us something”. Those are the 
words of a European Commission official uttered after the lost referendum 
over the Euro was lost in Sweden (“Voters can be such a nuisance”, The 
Economist, 18 September 2003).13 An unknown German official once said 
that because of the higher price of bananas German citizens would probably 
have rejected the Rome treaties of 1957, which started the process of Euro-
pean integration (“Europe should vote”, The Economist, 25 September 
2003). This is not surprising taking into consideration how little citizens 
know of the EU. A British Foreign Office research conducted in 2001 dis-
covered that a quarter of the British do not know that their country is a 
member of the EU, and 7% thought that the US is one of the Member States. 
In Germany, one survey showed that 31% of those questioned never heard of 
the European Commission (“The great debate”, The Economist, 12 June 
2003).  
 European politicians wanted to familiarize European citizens with the 
process and the goals of European integration by a constitutional convention 
and with public debate on the Draft Constitution. However, at the end it be-
came clear that this ‘great democratic experiment’ was useless because the 
abstract constitutional polemics and the referendum campaign gave an ideal 
forum to different anti-globalist groups, anti-immigration parties, and to all 
kinds of anti-establishment grumblers. In the case of the European Constitu-
tion, the referendum proved to be “a potentially dangerous instrument of di-
rect democracy” (Siedentop: 2005). 
 
12 The only amendment submitted to the popular conventions was the 21st, ratified in 1933, 
which nullified the 18th Amendment ratified in 1919, forbidding the production and sale of al-
cohol in the USA.  
13 French politicians forgot that the French electorate barely ratified the Maastricht treaty 
(with only 51% of ‘yes’ votes). 
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 At the time of the making of the Draft Constitution by the Convention on 
the Future of Europe the German Jürgen Schwarze Professor was, to my 
knowledge, one of the rare commentators of the European Constitution ar-
guing against the idea of its ratification by a referendum. As early as in 
2003, he wrote that the Draft was a document “too complex” and, therefore, 
unsuitable for referendum voting. In his opinion, the European Constitution 
could have “achieve[d] its legitimacy better by its convincing content and by 
its continuous acceptance in practical politics and by the people”. Schultze 
was against the possible amendments of the German Basic Law (Grundge-
setz), which would have allowed carrying out the referendum on the EU 
Constitution in Germany, thinking instead that the existing ratification pro-
cedure (two-thirds majority in both houses of the Parliament) was “sufficient 
to meet the demands of democratic legitimation”. He prophetically con-
cluded: “In view of the destiny of all visionary but failed constitutional 
drafts in the past I come to the conclusion the concept of pragmatism offers 
the best chances for realization, even in situations when there is a need for 
fundamental reforms such as the present” (Schultze, 2003: 1044).  
 Should we, then, in the adoption of treaties or, for that matter the Draft 
Constitution, consider the possibility of popular referendums? A serious re-
search carried out before the starting of the ratification process showed that 
the referendum option had some significant shortcomings and that popular 
involvement in the adoption of the Constitution did not have to mean that the 
problem of the ‘democratic deficit’ would be solved (Auer, 2004a). 
 National referendums on the EU issues belong, in principle, to the cate-
gory of the so-called ‘sovereignty referendums’ (souveränitätsreferenden), a 
sub-species of the constitutional referendums. Those referendums are not a 
rarity – after 40 EU referendums in 22 states until November 2004 they be-
came a solid member of the European integration instruments. Among them, 
there were 9 negative and 31 positive referendums. These referendums can 
put in two groups. The first group consists of referendums in which citizens 
decide on accession to a specific form of European integration (the European 
Community, the EU, or the Euro-zone). Those referendums, starting in the 
1970’s, have become almost inevitable in the process of accession of states 
to the EU, despite different constitutional obstacles and traditions. The rea-
son for this is a conviction that it is democratically doubtful to transfer cer-
tain sovereign powers to another level without asking the sovereign. The 
second group of national referendums includes popular voting on the con-
tinuation, or intensification of European integrative efforts, in the form of 
new treaties and amendments thereof.14 There were altogether nine such 
 
14 In perspective, Andreas Auer thinks a third species of national EU referendums possible, 
which would be related to the deciding on the accession to the EU of new countries (e.g. Tur-
key). Similarly, Miles divides European referendums in two groups. In the first group are refer-
endums whose “focus was essentially on whether to ‘belong’ to the Union”. The second kind of 
referendums is those related to a “process of becoming”, with focus on the specific goal of fur-
ther integration. The last such a referendum, before the referendums on the European Constitu-
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‘integrative referendums’, starting with the referendums in Denmark and 
Ireland on the Single European Act 1986/7. The referendums on the Consti-
tution belong to this category. It is this category of national EU referendums 
that is problematic. This is because these referendums are implemented ac-
cording to the national law, but they significantly affect the success of the 
supranational enterprise. This means that the citizens of each country decide 
not only on their approval of a particular project, but also on the destiny of 
that project, despite the opinion of the citizens in all the other Member 
States. Taking into consideration that EU treaties can be changed only 
unanimously, the possibility that citizens in only one country stop a particu-
lar integrative project is real. 
 Because of Article 447, which prescribes that the Constitution has to be 
ratified unanimously, in accordance with the respective constitutional re-
quirements of the Member States, each state has a veto on the Constitution. 
It might happen that a few thousand voters in one state prevent the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution despite the wishes of hundreds of millions of citizens 
in other Member States. The American and Swiss experience with constitu-
tion-making is most valuable at this point. 
 The adoption of the American Constitution in 1787-88 and the Swiss 
Constitution in 1848 provide the only comparative experiences or models for 
the EU Constitution as adoptions of federal constitutions by the people (di-
rectly by referendum or indirectly through conventions). In the American 
case the constitution-makers avoided the unanimity trap (as enacted in the 
Articles of Confederation) by prescribing that the Constitution would come 
into force when ratified by at least nine states and would be valid only for 
the ratifying states. So the American solution escaped the possibility of veto 
by one or a few states, while letting each state choose freely to become a 
member of the new federal system or not.  
 The solution of the Swiss constitution-makers was different. After the 
short civil war a committee of the confederal assembly (Diet) composed of 
one member from each canton, worked out a draft of the federal constitution 
and submitted it to the people of each canton for approval. The Constitution 
was accepted in referendums in 15.5 cantons and rejected in 6.5 cantons. 
After receiving the results from the cantons, the Diet decided that the vast 
majority of the people had accepted the Constitution, and declared it ratified. 
Although the earlier constitution of the Confederation did not have a provi-
 
tion, was the Swedish referendum on the Euro in 2003. His conclusion is that referendums on 
‘belonging’ are not problematic, because in a state (or a candidate state) a critical mood of a 
proportion that would result in secession from, or a refusal to accede to the EU would be evi-
dent. However, referendums on further integration are evermore hazardous, as evident from the 
experiences with the treaties of Maastricht or Nice, the Euro or the European Constitution. 
Therefore, there is no inherent ‘Euro-skepticism’ in the EU in the sense of opposing the mem-
bership, but a kind of ‘federal skepticism’, in the sense of further integration leading to a possi-
ble federal Europe (Miles, 2004). 
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sion on its revision, it was thought that it could be revised only by the 
unanimous consent of each canton. The Swiss constitution-makers departed 
from this unwritten rule, rejecting the principle of unanimity of cantons in 
the revision of or adoption of the new federal constitution. According to 
Auer, this was “a revolutionary act, founded both on power and on the 
agreement by the cantons which had lost the war to take part in the new 
scheme of government” (Auer, 2004b, 39-40).  
 Had the European constitution-makers had in view the American and 
Swiss experience, they would never have opted for unanimity as a condition 
for the EU Constitution coming into force, accompanied by the popular ref-
erendum as an instrument of ratification.  
 The fact is that numerous members of the Brussels Convention were con-
scious of the possibility that the Constitution would not pass the referendum 
hurdle in some states. The supporters of the popular referendum submitted 
their proposal titled, “Referendum on the European Constitution” to the 
Convention. In it they insisted that “if the Constitution is to have real democ-
ratic legitimacy, then it ought to be put to the people of Europe in a Europe-
wide referendum”. To ratify the Constitution in some other way would, in 
their opinion, “simply reinforce the impression of a deep democratic deficit 
in Europe” and “it would also send a signal that Europe is not about the peo-
ple but about the governing elites”. According to the proposal, the referen-
dum should have been held on the same day as the elections for the Euro-
pean Parliament. In states where no provision existed for popular referen-
dum, at least a consultative referendum would be held. A double majority 
would have been required for the ratification of the Constitution – a majority 
of citizens and a majority of states. If the proposed Constitution was rejected 
in any Member State, this state could repeat the referendum, regulate a spe-
cial relationship with the ‘new’ European Union by a bilateral treaty, or sim-
ply secede from the Union. 
 This way, two extremes could have been avoided: “no country can be 
forced under the new constitution against the will of its citizens, and on the 
other side, one country alone cannot block the whole constitutional process 
by its veto” (Referendum on the European Constitution, CONV 658/03 of 31 
March 2003). The proposal is, essentially, similar to the one devised by the 
American constitution-makers.15 This proposal for an all-European referen-
dum was signed by 92 delegates of the Convention (“Ratification problems 
loom over Convention”, Euobserver, 31 May 2003), but in the end the ex-
isting ratification procedure was accepted, and because of that, as we know 
now, the destiny of the European Constitution was sealed. According to the 
 
15 The nine states needed for ratification of the Philadelphia Constitution had a minimal ma-
jority of population of the US at the time. The Draft Constitution recommended by the Euro-
pean Commission followed a similar pattern, proposing that the EU Constitution would come 
into force after the declaration of three-fourths of the Member States affirming the will of their 
people to stay in the Union (See European Commission, 2002).  
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double majority rule, there is a great probability that the Constitution would 
be ratified – 18 member states have already ratified the document (the ma-
jority of the overall EU population), and what is even more important, the 
majority of voters voted for the Constitution (26.6 to 22 million) in the 
Member States where the referendum was chosen as an instrument of ratifi-
cation. 
 The whole historical experience with the direct popular voting on 
constitutions in the framework of a federal/confederal system, from the rati-
fication of the American Constitution 1787-88 to the contemporary referen-
dums on the European Constitution, confirms that it is in no way certain that 
the people will accept the constitution, and that the ancient warning of 
Oliver Ellsworth – that people’s voting is better fitted to pull down than to 
build up Constitutions – is still relevant today.  
 European analysts are looking at the causes of negative voting in the 
referendums principally in the belief that people actually vote on the internal 
political issues of their country, or on confidence to the government, or sim-
ply against further integrative projects. Although I cannot elaborate on a dif-
ferent thesis here, I would just like to indicate one. Perhaps, the causes of 
negative voting, when we speak about federal/confederal unions, should be 
searched in people’s fear of the of a still more remote supranational govern-
ment, which will in many ways affect their lives, but which would be much 
harder to control than the existing national government. Inseparably con-
nected with this remote central, imperial, or supranational government is the 
so-called democratic deficit i.e., a whole spectrum of problems linked to the 
implementation of representative or direct democracy. The opponents of the 
American Constitution – incorrectly named, the Antifederalists – were prin-
cipally against one strong central government, which reminded them of the 
former imperial British government. Contemporary ‘Antifederalists’ in 
France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Denmark, or Sweden see the supra-
national institutions in Brussels similarly. As simply put by Nils Lundgren, a 
Euro-skeptic member of the EP from Sweden: “People don’t like these E.U. 
structures. They are too far away, not transparent and undermining democ-
racy by moving too much of the decision making process from the national 
parliaments to the E.U.” (“Closer Union or Superstate”, Time, June 28, 
2004).  
 Some superficial comparisons of the ratification of the American 
Constitution in 1787-88 with the French referendum in 2005 show an im-
pressive similarity. They show that the main centers of support for the 
American Constitution were in larger, urban and coastal environments, 
which were, even in the 18th century America, characterized by a higher 
level of commerce, education and cosmopolitan spirit, and that the oppo-
nents of the Constitution predominated in rural areas, isolated from the 
commercial areas. Much more detailed analyses of voting on the French ref-
erendum show that the majority of the people in large cities, such as Paris 
and Lyon, voted for the EU Constitution, and in rural areas the majority 
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voted against it (Nicolaidis, 2005).16 Does this pattern of voting with an 
interval of more than two centuries, give sufficient ground for the claim that 
generally the support to a federal/confederal constitution is higher with the 
degree of urbanization, education, and openness of society? I cannot elabo-
rate on this hypothesis further here, but I believe that there are enough indi-
cations present to justify further checking of my hypothesis.  
 
The non-existent strategy of ratification  
 It seems that the European constitution-makers did not consider some-
thing that could be called a strategy of ratification. I use the term as William 
Riker and Evelyn Fink did in their article on the strategy of ratification de-
vised by the proponents of the American Constitution. Riker and Fink do not 
give a definition of the ratification strategy, but this definition, if we analyze 
their arguments, would encompass the choosing of the model of ratification, 
the speed of ratification, and the sequence of states in the ratification, ac-
ceptance of proposals of the opponents in a measure that would not affect 
the ratification in several states, specific argumentation in support of the 
constitution adapted to different states, and finally strong propaganda in fa-
vor of the constitution (Fink and Riker, 1987: 220-255). 
 The American constitution-makers carefully deliberated which model of 
ratification might be the best and most advantageous for the ratification. The 
debates on the Convention demonstrated the deep conviction of the Framers 
that the content was very important for the destiny of the Constitution, but 
more important was to ensure easier and more likely ratification. In the end, 
these arguments convinced the majority of delegates that the ratification by 
the people’s conventions was a less hazardous procedure than the ratification 
by the state legislatures.  
 In the European Convention such debates pro et contra of different mod-
els of ratification, from the standpoint of its easier and more secure adoption, 
as far as I know, were missing.17 Those members of the Convention favoring 
the ratification by referendum argued for greater democratic legitimacy, and 
not greater probability of its adoption. Had the Convention made an analysis 
of earlier European referendums, they would indisputably have seen that 
 
16 Paul Hainsworth speaks about the voting division in ‘two Frances’ based on socioeco-
nomic criteria: one was more urban, wealthy, integrated, educated and successful; whereas the 
other was more marked by socioeconomic decline, unemployment, marginalization or exclu-
sion” (Hainsworth, 2006: 105-108). See also Ivaldi, 2006. 
17 As pointed out by Wojciech Sadurski (citing Bruno De Witte): “The main fault of the 
Convention was that it focused all its attention on the substance of the new Treaty and none on 
the process of adopting it” (Sadurski, 2005).  
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ratification of the constitution by popular referendum was to be much more 
hazardous than ratification by parliaments.18 
 One of the American constitution-makers warned his colleagues during 
the Philadelphia Convention that in the making of a constitution “a little 
practical virtue is to be preferred to the finest theoretical principles, which 
cannot be carried into effect” (Farrand, 1966, 1; 258). The European consti-
tution-makers did not follow this recommendation and neither did European 
politicians, insisting on the referendum option in their countries, even if this 
model was not constitutionally required. If the political elite in France and 
the Netherlands thought more about the practical virtue of parliamentary 
ratification and less about the legitimacy value of the popular approval, we 
would not be talking about the European Constitution as a ‘political corpse’. 
 It is also indisputable that the European constitution-makers made a huge 
mistake opting for the unanimous ratification of the Constitution. They 
should have proposed ratification by some qualified majority of Member 
States (e.g. four-fifths), as the American Framers did. At the beginning of 
the Convention, James Wilson brought “the idea of not suffering a disposi-
tion in the plurality of States to confederate anew on better principles, to be 
defeated by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few (States)”, and 
therefore the ratification procedure had to be such “to admit of such a partial 
union, with a door open for the accession of the rest” (Farrand, 1966, 1; 
123). This attitude was accepted by the vast majority of delegates, concre-
tizing it with the constitutional provision that the new Constitution would 
come into force when ratified by three-fourths of States of the existing Con-
federation, and be valid for those states only. It is important to say that with 
this provision the American constitution-makers did not want a partial union 
and an everlasting secession of those states not ratifying the Constitution. In-
stead, they calculated that the adoption of the Constitution in the first ten 
states would positively act on its acceptance in the other, more reluctant 
states with stronger opposition to the new federal system. It is a fact that the 
 
18 Let me give just one example of the process of ‘constitutional learning’ of the European 
constitution-makers. Having in mind the unproblematic parliamentary ratification of the EU 
Constitution in each and every Member state to date, the failure of constitutional referendums in 
France and the Netherlands, and the fact that in four referendums on the Constitution up to date 
an overall majority of voters voted for the ratification; last year, some former members of the 
European Convention proposed a new method of ratification of the renegotiated European Con-
stitution. According to Andrew Duff (borrowing Neil MacCormick’s idea) the modified Con-
stitution should be ratified in the following way: first, a classical parliamentary ratification 
would take place in each member state, and afterwards the Constitution would be submitted “to 
a final, yet formal and single referendum across the EU. In this case, the national ratifications 
would establish the constitution on a provisional basis subject to confirmation by a (simple or 
qualified) majority of European citizens”. According to this procedure the European Constitu-
tion would have a much better chance of success. It looks even like a nice compromise solution 
between supporters of the parliamentary ratification and advocates of the direct involvement of 
the European citizens in the process of constitutional adoption. (Duff, 2006: 18). For a similar 
idea see Pascal, 2006. 
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states of New York (whose delegation left Philadelphia), Rhode Island 
(whose delegation was not even present in Philadelphia, and whose citizens 
voted against the Constitution in the referendum) and North Carolina (whose 
ratification convention at first also voted against the Constitution) ratified 
the Constitution reluctantly, when it was already in force for the other 10 
states. This shows that the American constitution-makers’ strategy of ratifi-
cation was correct. 
 Further, the American constitution-makers very well devised and coordi-
nated their activities in choosing the time and sequence of ratification in the 
several states, although this was not easy in those times. They carried out a 
quick ratification in some states, not letting the opposition organize (as in 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts), they accomplished speedy and almost 
unanimous ratification in four small states (for which they correctly esti-
mated that membership in the new federal system was essential to their fur-
ther survival), and they left those significant states in which they expected 
the greatest opposition to the end (Virginia and New York). This way the 
ratification convention in the most important and largest state, Virginia, with 
a strongly divided political elite on the issue of the Constitution, debated the 
Constitution at the moment when it was already accepted in nine states, 
which was the precondition of its coming into force. This fact was of great 
influence in Virginia, and later in New York, securing the adoption of the 
Constitution in those states; although it is the prevalent opinion even today 
that the opponents of the Constitution in these states were in the majority 
both in the electorate, and in the state ratification convention. 
 It could not be disputed that the Intergovernmental Conference was con-
scious of the possibility that the European constitution would not be unani-
mously ratified. In the last of 30 declarations which accompanied the Con-
stitution it was prescribed: “The Conference notes that if two years after the 
signature of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, four fifths of 
the Member States have ratified it and one or more Member States have en-
countered difficulties in proceeding with ratification, the matter will be re-
ferred to the European Council” (“Declaration on the ratification of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Union, C310/464). The problem with this Declaration is that it does not 
specify a possible solution – the Constitution simply transferred the problem 
of non-ratification to the heads of states and governments with no guidelines 
on what to do.19 In a sense, Declaration no. 30 on the ratification of the Con-
stitution gave neither a legal, nor a political solution to the situation of non-
ratification in one or more Member States. 
 
 
19 A German analyst (Schvarze, 2005: 1130) claims that the Declaration was intentionally 
so ambivalent because no one wanted to provoke a possible constitutional fiasco (a sort of “self 
fulfilling prophecy”) with a more detailed regulation of an extraordinary situation (the failure of 
ratification in one or more Member States). I find such an explanation not quite logical. 
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Conclusions 
 The failure of the project called, the European Constitution should not be 
surprising. The European constitution-makers have made so many mistakes 
in the process of its creation that, objectively speaking; it was hard to expect 
a different result.  
 It is fair to conclude that the constitutional terminology of the European 
Convention was of no value to the EU Constitution. Just the opposite: this 
constitutional vocabulary mobilized all the opponents of European integra-
tion against the document seeing in it the first symbolic step towards the 
creation of some future European federal state. The Euro-skeptics fought 
against the European Constitution exactly because of its constitutional ideas 
and terminology: the new name suggested and strengthened the claim that 
the European Union is moving towards a sort of a super-state, namely a cen-
tralized statal polity (Heathcoat-Amory, 2004). Conversely, by calling the 
newest European treaty ‘a constitution’, the higher expectations of European 
citizens – that this document would strengthen democracy, the efficiency 
and responsibility of European institutions – were not fulfilled. The Consti-
tutional treaty did not get “constitutional legitimacy”, in particular because it 
did not look like a constitution. What is more important, declaring “The 
Treaty on establishing the Constitution for Europe” to be a “Constitution for 
Europe” required in some countries, politically if not legally, a popular ref-
erendum. This is exactly what happened in France and in the Netherlands.20  
 When discussing the ratification procedure at the Convention, the Euro-
pean constitution-makers could not accept, that the document they were pre-
paring requires direct popular acceptance. A large minority insisted on rati-
fying the Constitution “as usual”. Because of this the Convention did not 
specify a unique ratification procedure that emphasized the role of the peo-
ple at the level of the EU, and which would be as advantageous as possible 
to the probability of the Constitution’s ratification. The question that has to 
be answered by the European constitution-makers is: What is the point of 
declaring a document to be “a constitution”, and not “a treaty”, and then 
proceed as usual – to ratify this “constitution” exactly in the same way as all 
the treaties were ratified before? It is a mistake that the American founding 
fathers did not make – they knew that the document they had drafted could 
not be named “a constitution” and then ratified by the same procedure as the 
confederal treaty called the Articles of Confederation was (but even they 
opted for representative conventions rather than a popular referendum). 
 
20 Analyzing why President Chirac decided to submit the European Constitution to a popu-
lar referendum, although he was constitutionally not bound to, Joachim Schild finds that “the 
treaty reform and especially symbolically highly burdened labelling of the project as a ‘Consti-
tution’ would have its costs in the internal policy, in case of not asking the sovereign”, espe-
cially after the announcement of the constitutional referendum in Great Britain (Schild, 2005: 
188). 
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 I would dare to say that avoiding just one, although fundamental, error in 
the constitution- making process, would have had huge consequences for the 
positive ratification of the European constitution. In the case of the European 
Constitution, the popular referendum proved to be a dangerous instrument of 
democracy. There was, in my opinion, no need to jeopardize the European 
constitution playing with a potentially very dangerous instrument of popular 
democracy, especially when there was no constitutional obligation to do so, 
and when the rules applied were most unfavorable for the ratification. To 
paraphrase the words of an American Founding Father – the European con-
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